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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11 (1896) [Courts
open - Redress of injuries] and Article I, Section 24 (1896)
[Uniform operation of laws], along with Utah Code Annotated,
Section

35-1-68

(1979)

are

the

applicable

determinative

constitutional and statutory provisions. See Addendum Exhibit A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioners seek review of the Industrial Commission Order
denying their Motion for Review wherein they sought dependents'
benefits due to the death of David K. Hales, who was injured in an
industrial accident on May 24, 1982 and died over 6 years later on
November

25, 1988, allegedly

as a result of his

industrial

accident.
Course of Proceedings
On March 23, 1989 and March 31, 1989, as required by Utah Code
Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (2) (a) (1979), Petitioners, as Mr.
Hales7 dependents, filed dependents' death claims within one year
of his demise alleging that Mr. Hales' demise was occasioned by his
1982 industrial accident.

Emery Mining Corporation, Mr. Hales7

Employer, and its workers compensation insurance carrier, Energy
2

Mutual Insurance Company, denied responsibility for death benefits
based on the limitation found in Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-168 (2) (1979) which provides in relevant part that "In case injury
causes death within the period of six years from the date of the
accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial
expenses as provided in Section 35-1-81 ..." and other compensation
as provided in Section 68.
Disposition Below
On April 3, 1992 the Administrative Law Judge held that
Petitioners'

claims

were

barred

by

the

six-year

statute of

limitations found in Section 68. Because Mr. Hales was injured in
an industrial accident on May 24, 1982 and died over six years
later on November 25, 1988, allegedly as a result of his industrial
accident, Petitioners' claims were held to be forever barred. The
Administrative Law Judge did note, however, that the reasoning of
a prior decision of this Court (Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission,
786 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1990), cert, den. , 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah
1990) "... might be said to be analogous ...", but he declined to
rule on Petitioners7 constitutional challenge of Section 68. (R. at
103-110; and See Addendum Exhibit B.)
On April 17, 1992 Petitioners filed a Motion for Review with
the Industrial Commission of Utah alleging, inter alia, that the
statutory provision contained in Section 68 violated the Utah
Constitution's "Open Courts" and "Equal Protection" provisions by
extinguishing their constitutional right to litigate a valid claim
before their right to

file their claim
3

arose, and treating

dependents of injured workers who die before six years from the
date of the industrial accident differently than those of injured
workers who die after six years from the date of the industrial
accident,

(R. at 108-111).

On May

6,

Administrative

1992
Law

the

Industrial

Judge's

Order;

Commission
however,

affirmed

the

the

Industrial

Commission noted in denying Petitioners' Motion for Review that "In
view of Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission. 786 P.2d 243 [(Utah
App.] 1990 I" ,cert. den. , 795 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1990)] and the Velarde
Tv. Industrial Commission, 184 Ut. Adv. Rep. 79 (Utah Ct. App. ,
filed, April 14, 1992)] case which was decided after the instant
case, it is apparent that Section 35-1-68 (2) [1979] is likely to
be declared unconstitutional." (R. at 118-120; and See Addendum
Exhibit C).

Nevertheless, and like the Administrative Law Judge,

the Industrial Commission declined to rule on the constitutional
question raised by Petitioners' Motion for Review indicating that
such questions were beyond the agency's limited jurisdiction and
that it would have to be addressed to this Court.
Statement of the Facts
The facts in this matter are not in dispute or at issue.
On May 24, 1982 the deceased, David K. Hales, sustained a
compensable accident while employed by Emery Mining Corporation.
(R. at

103) .

On that date, Mr. Hales was

involved

in an

underground coal mine cave-in from which he suffered severe and
unrelenting medical problems for the remainder of his life. (R. at
103).
4

He

was

initially

paid

temporary,

total

disability

compensation, and was awarded 32% permanent, partial disability
compensation for orthopedic and internal medical problems, and for
anxiety, depression

and

intractable pain.

(R. at

103).

He

continued to suffer from his industrial injuries which eventually
culminated

in his being

awarded

permanent, total

disability

compensation. (R. at 58-62).
On November 25, 1988, Mr. Hales was found dead at his home by
his wife. (R. at 79).

Petitioners subsequently filed dependents'

death claims alleging that Mr. Hales7 demise was occasioned by his
1982 industrial accident.
detailed above.

(R. at 78) . Those claims were denied as

Petitioners filed a Motion for Review with the

Industrial Commission on April 17, 1992 ( R. at 115), but it was
denied on May 6, 1992 (R. at 118-120).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S)
Petitioners allege that Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68
(2)

(1979)

provision.

violates

the

Utah

Constitution's

"Open

Courts"

Petitioners' submit that the statute which permits an

industrial death claim by dependents only in cases where the
deceased dies within six years form the date of the industrial
accident is an unconstitutional statute of repose because it
deprives them of a cause of action before their claim for death
benefits ever arose, i.e., when Mr. Hales died.
The deceased was injured in an industrial accident on May 24,
1982 and died on November 25, 1988, over six years after the
5

occurrence

of his industrial injury.

Petitioners allege that the

industrial injury was the underlying cause of his death and filed
their dependents' claims based thereon.

Because the cause of

action did not arise until Mr. Hales 7 death, Petitioners' claim
could not have been filed until he died - if at all - which in this
case was after the six year statute of limitation period provided
for in Section 68 had expired.

Petitioners should not now be

penalized by being denied death benefits based upon Mr. Hales'
failure to die before the expiration of the six year period of time
following his industrial accident as provided for by Section 68.
Petitioners submit that Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68
(2) (1979) is contrary to the "Open Courts" provision of the Utah
Constitution.

See Wrolstad, supra and Velarde, supra.

It is

difficult to distinguish this case from these two prior rulings of
this Court involving statutes of repose in industrial compensation
matters.

Interestingly

enough,

even

Respondent

Industrial

Commission of Utah acknowledges that the challenged statute in this
case is "likely to be declared unconstitutional. (R. at 118). In
addition,

in

response

to the

Petitioner's

Motion

for

Summary

Disposition essentially raising this argument, Respondents Emery
Mining Corporation and Energy Mutual Insurance Company on July 10,
1992 conceded that the analysis and ruling in the Velarde, supra,
case applies to Section 68 in this case.
And finally, the Petitioners further submit that the "Equal
Protection" provision of the Utah Constitution requirement that all
laws have uniform operation which has been interpreted as requiring
6

that

"persons

similarly

situated

should

be treated

similarly"

further underscores the inequitable treatment of dependents whose
deceased dies before as distinguished from those whose deceased
dies after six years from the date of their respective industrial
accidents, and who desire to file a claim for death benefits under
Section

68.

There

can be no rational

justification

for the

disparity which results since they have no control over the event
which determines timeliness of the filing of a claim, i.e., the
date of the injured worker's demise.

ARGUMENT
I
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS CORRECTION OF
ERROR WITH NO DEFERENCE TO THE COMMISSION'S VIEW OF THE
LAW,
This case was commenced after the effective date of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Annotated, Section
63-46b-l et. seq. (1989), and is thus subject to the standard of
review set forth in that act. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63,66 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
As under prior

law, the determination

of the

appropriate

standard of review turns on whether the issue presented is one of
law, fact, or a question of mixed law and fact.

There is no

question that this dispute involves a pure question of law and such
was recognized by the Industrial Commission in its Denial of Motion
for Review. (R. at 118-120).

7

The central and essential issues presented on appeal deals
with the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. Such issues
are questions of law, which under Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988) of
the

UAPA

are

reviewed

pursuant

to

the

"correction-of

error"

standard with no deference to the agency's view of the law being
required. Bevans v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 790 P. 2d 573
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)•
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to
compensation is to be resolved in favor of Petitioners' claims.
State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 685 P.2d
1051, 1053 (Utah 1984).

McPhie v. Industrial Commission of Utah,

567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977).

II
THE STATUTE OF REPOSE CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
SECTION 35-1-68 (2) (1981) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
VIOLATING THE "OPEN COURTS" PROVISION OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION,
The

so

called

"Open

Courts"

provision

of

the

Utah

Constitution, Article I, Section 11 (1896) provides in material
part that "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall
have

remedy

by

due

course

of

law...."

This

constitutional

provision has been construed to impose limitations on a legislature
when it passes laws which modify the rights of those persons who
have been injured in their person, property or reputation.
8

The proper analysis for determining whether a statute of
repose unconstitutionally violates the "Open Courts11 provision of
the Utah Constitution was clearly delineated by the Utah Supreme
Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
Berry sets forth a two-pronged approach: (1) the law must provide
the injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy;
and (2) if there is no substantial and alternative remedy there
must be a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the
means selected must not be arbitrary or unreasonable.
A careful examination of those two prongs reveals that neither
can be satisfied under Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (2)
(1979).
A.

EFFECTIVE AND REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE REMEDY.

Petitioners

did

not

have

an

effective

and

reasonable

alternative remedy in this case for the simple reason that they
could not file for dependents' benefits in a death claim until the
injured worker died.

The dependents of an injured worker who

manages to survive for six years or more after his industrial
injury and then succumbs are left wholly without remedy, if the six
year statute of repose is constitutional.
There is no provision in the Workers' Compensation Act or
other law which would allow one to file for speculative loss or
impairment

which

does

not presently

exist, but which

could

conceivably come into existence in the future.
The Court in Wrolstad, supra at 245, acknowledged that "a
person can't file an occupational disease claim for a disease he
9

does not know he has." Likewise, Petitioners could not file their
dependents7 death claims within six years of the date of the
accident as required by the statute because they did not know, nor
could anyone have known, that Mr. Hales was going to subsequently
die from the injuries he suffered from the industrial accident. It
is precisely that fact which makes the statute one of repose and
not limitation.
Professor Larson cites the clear problems and fundamental
unfairness that such a repose statute creates:
The classic illustration is that of the apparently
trivial accident that matures into a disabling injury
after the claim period has expired. A workman is struck
in the eye by a metal chip, but both he and the company
doctors dismiss the accident as a petty one, and of
course no claim is made, since there is no present injury
or disability. Eighteen months later a cataract develops
as the direct result of the accident. If the statute
bars claims filed more than one year after the
Occident,' and if the court applies the statutory
language with medieval literalism, the workman can never
collect for the injury no matter how diligent he is: he
cannot claim during the year because no compensable
injury exists; he cannot claim after the year, because
the statute runs from the accident. 2B Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law, Section 78.42(a), page 15-262 (1989).
* * *

Limitations periods are of course constitutional in
general, but is such a period valid when it begins to run
before a claim exists and assumes to destroy it before it
is born? Is it not elementary that the running of the
period must be related to the time of acquisition of the
enforceable right, rather that of some event which may or
may not coincide with that acquisition?
Suppose a
statute were passed which said that, in the event of any
highway collision, suit must be commenced within two
years of the last presidential election. This is in no
way any sillier or more oppressive than a statute which
says that a man who gets a bit of grime in his eye in
1960 which causes only slight irritation must bring a
claim for blindness within one year of that time—
blindness that does not develop until 1962. 2B Larson,
10

Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 78.42(e), page 15272.5 (1989).
Since the filing of a claim against the employer and/or its
workers compensation insurance carrier must be filed with the
Industrial Commission of Utah because of the exclusive remedy
doctrine, Petitioners' inability to file their claims in this case
through the industrial system because of the six year statute of
limitation found in Section 68 does not provide them with any
alternative, equal legal remedy for redressing their loss.
Thus, since Petitioners had no substitute equal alternative
remedy to the one barred by the six year statute of repose, the
statute can only be upheld if it passes the second prong of the
Berry analysis.
B.

EXISTENCE OF CLEAR SOCIAL OR ECONOMIC EVIL.

Under the Berry second prong, the purpose of the six year
statue of repose must be to eliminate a clear social or economic
evil.

In addition, the statutes's extermination of Petitioners'

remedy must not be an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving
the objective.

Berry at 680.

To determine whether there is a

clear social or economic evil, a due process type "balancing
analysis" is to be applied which weighs the particular infringement
on the Article I, Section 11 interest against the justifications
offered for the restriction.

Id. at 679-80.

Under the rule announced in Velarde, if the first prong of
Berry is found violated, as is argued above, then the burden shifts
to the Respondents to demonstrate the statute's constitutionality
under the Berry second prong.

Id. at 9.
11

The Respondents below

utterly fail to carry this burden forward and in fact conceded that
the statute is unconstitutional. (R. at 118).
The public policy of the Utah Workers Compensation Act is to
alleviate hardship upon workers and their families when disabling,
work-related injuries occur, and the statute is to be construed
liberally to afford coverage to an injured worker during a time of
need.

Produce v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 562 P. 2d 1354

(Utah 1983); Baker v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 405 P.2d 613
(Utah 1965).

"Furthermore, to facilitate the purposes of the

legislation, the Workers' Compensation Act

is to be

liberally

construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in
favor of the applicant." Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
800 P.2d 330, 333 (Utah App. 1990), and cases cited therein.
Against this interest the Respondents must demonstrate that
there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated.

The

Legislature in enacting the six year statute of repose did not make
legislative findings as the purpose the statute of repose was to
serve.

The social or economic evil argument simply does not apply

to the facts of this case.
Mr. Hales' accident was promptly reported to his employers and
Respondents
considerable

have

had

period

the

benefit

of time. The

of

medical

existence

records

of his

over

a

industrial

accident was established and he was awarded benefits accordingly.
(R. at 228 and 258-62) . Respondents can point to no difficulty and
certainly no impossibility in defending the causation or existence
of injuries in this matter.

As the Court in Sun Valley Water Beds
12

v, Hughes & Son, 782 P. 2d 118, 193

(Utah 1989) remarked in

rejecting the same argument: "While the passage of time causes
inherent difficulty in defending any lawsuit, it also causes equal,
if not greater, difficult in initiating just legal action."
Additionally,

the

same

economic

evil

argument

was made

unsuccessfully by the Respondents in Velarde. In that case this
Court held as follows:
We are not persuaded that easing an employees burden in
proving causation is an economic interest that rises to
the level of a clear economic evil. Moreover, Kennecott
makes no showing that the statute actually achieves the
stated legislative purpose of reducing claims in which
silicosis is actually caused by other sources.
* * *

This statutory scheme, which includes in its sweep the
class of people for whom timing, rather than causation,
is a problem, is overbroad in its application and thus
unreasonable and arbitrary... Kennecott has thus failed
to show that there is a clear social or economic evil to
be eliminated by this statute of repose, and that the
means of achieving the statute's purported economic
objectives are not just 'an arbitrary and impermissible
shifting of collective burdens to individual citizens.'
(citations omitted) Id. at 11.
Respondents here suffer from the same failure.
there no showing

that the statute actually

Not only is

accomplishes any

beneficent purposes, even if it did, such a purpose would not
outweigh Petitioner's constitutional right to a remedy.

Ill
THE STATUTE OP REPOSE CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED/
SECTION 35-1-68 (2) (1981) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
VIOLATING THE "EQUAL PROTECTION" PROVISION OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.

13

The principle of equal protection is set forth in the Utah
Constitution, Article I, Section 24 (1896) as follows:

"All laws

of a general nature shall have uniform operation."

The Utah

Supreme Court has held that although dissimilar, this language
embodies the same principal as the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution,

It embraces the notion that "persons

similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in
different

circumstances

should

circumstances were the same."

not

be

treated

as

if

their

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661, 669

(Utah 1984) .
In

assessing

whether

a

statute

meets

equal

protection

standards, a court must consider the objectives of the statute and
whether the classifications contained therein provide a reasonable
basis for promoting these objectives:
When
persons
are
similarly
situated,
it
is
unconstitutional to single out one person or group of
persons from among a larger class on the basis of a
tenuous justification that has little or no merit. Id.
at 671.
In Velarde, supra at 12, this Court held that "Because the
open courts provision is dispositive, we need not reach the equal
protection question."

This Court in the interest of clarity and

brevity should adopt the same analysis and dispose of this matter
on the "open courts" analysis provided above.
Petitioner's argument under this point, however, is that the
statute of repose at issue here impermissibly restricts dependents
of an injured worker from bringing claims for dependents' benefits
beyond an arbitrary time frame unlawfully discriminates against
14

those dependents of injured workers who somehow manage to survive
for six years following their industrial accident and then die due
to causes directly related to the industrial injury.

CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court hold that the
statute of repose for dependents of injured workers who die more
than six years after the industrial accident found in Utah Code
Annotated Section 35-1-68 (2) (1979)l is unconstitutional and remand
to the

Industrial

Commission

of Utah

for a hearing

on the

merits.
DATED this 1st day of September, 1992.
DABNEY & DABNEy, p

A similar provision
in the Utah Occupational Disease Code, i.e.,
Utah Code
Annotated,
Section 35-2-108 (3) (1991), for similar reasons is
constitutionally
defective,
and even though it is not directly
involved in this case, should also
be addressed
in any decision
issued by this
Court.
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I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Petitioners were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 1st day
of September, 1992 to the following:
(1 original & 4 copies)
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 South 300 East
Post Office Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(4 copies)

Rinehart 1. Peshell, Esq,
FAIRBOURN & PESHELL
73 21 South State
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Dexter L. Anderson, Esq.
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(1 copy)

Mrs. Marilyn B. Hales
P.O. Box 93
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(1 copy)

Mrs. Robyn L. Chambers
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(1 copy)

File
DABN
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11 (1896).
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24 (1896).
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (2) (1979).

EXHIBIT B:

Order of April 3, 1992.

EXHIBIT C:

Denial of Motion for Review of May 6, 1992.
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11 (1896),
injuries.]

[Courts open - Redress of

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in
his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24
laws.]

(1896).

[Uniform operation of

All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (1979).
(1) There is created a second injury fund for the purpose of making
payments in accordance with the provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of this
title. This fund shall succeed to all monies heretofore held in that
fund designated as the "special fund" or the "combined injury fund" and
whenever reference is made elsewhere in this code to the "special fund"
or the "combined injury fund" that reference shall be deemed to be to
the second injury fund. The state treasurer shall be the custodian of
the second injury fund and the commission shall direct its distribution.
Reasonable administration assistance may be paid from the proceeds of
that fund.
The attorney general shall appoint a member of his staff to
represent the second injury fund in all proceedings brought to enforce
claims against it.
(2) In case injury causes death within the period of six years from the
date of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the
burial expenses of the deceased as provided in section 35-1-81, and
further benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows:
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from
the date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for
the employer or insurance carrier to pay into the second injury fund the
sum of $18,720.
The $18,720 shall be reduced by the amount of any
weekly compensation payments paid to or due the deceased between the
date of the accident and death.
Should a dependency claim be filed
subsequent to the issuance of such an order and, thereafter, a
determination of dependency is made by the commission, the award shall
first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to the second injury
fund by the employer or insurance carrier before any further claim may
be asserted against the employer or insurance carrier. In the event no
dependency claim is filed within one year from the date of death, the
commission's temporary order shall become permanent and final. If no
temporary order has been issued and no claim for dependency has been
filed within one year from the date of death, the commission may issue
a permanent order at any time requiring the carrier or employer to pay
Exhibit A

$18,720 into the second injury fund. Any claim for compensation by a
dependent must be filed with the commission within one year from the
date of death of the deceased.
(b) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the
death, the payment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be 66 2/3%
of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not
more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus
$5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under
the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week, to continue during dependency
for the remainder of the period between the date of the death and not to
exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury.
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during
dependency following the expiration of the first six-year period
described in subsection (2) (b) (i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons during that initial sixyear period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal social security death
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons.
(iii)
The issue of dependency shall be subject to review
by the commission at the end of the initial six-year period and annually
thereafter.
If in any such review it is determined that, under the
facts and circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is not
longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a
partly dependent or non-dependent person and shall be paid such benefits
as the commission may determine pursuant to subsection (2)(c)(ii).
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving
spouse of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be
wholly dependent for a six-year period from the date of death of the
employee. This presumption shall not apply after the initial six-year
period and, in determining the then existing annual income of the
surviving spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any federal social
security death benefits received by that surviving spouse.
(c) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the
death, the payment shall be 66 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not
less than a minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for
the remainder of the period between the date of death and not to exceed
six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission in
each case may determine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of
$18,720.
The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in
keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at
the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the commission under this
subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this title.
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent
pursuant to subsection (2)(b)(iii) shall be determined by the commission
in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing
at the time of the dependency review and may be paid in a weekly amount
not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that partly dependent person would
receive if wholly dependent.

(iii)
Payments under this section shall be paid to such
persons during their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier.
(d) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly
dependent persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion the
benefits as it deems just and equitable; provided, that the total
benefits awarded to all parties concerned shall not exceed the maximum
provided for by law.
(e) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of
death and the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or its
insurance carrier to said dependents, prior to the termination of
dependency, including any remarriage settlement, does not exceed
$18,72 0, the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference
between the amount paid and the sum of $18,720 into the second injury
fund provided for in subsection (1).
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MARILYN R. HALES, Widow of, and
DELBERT HALES, MONICA HALES, and
CRISTAL HALES, Minor Dependent
Children of DAVID K. HALES,
Deceased,

*
*
*
*
*

Applicants,

'*•
*

vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT (EMERY MINING)
and/or ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE,

*
*
*
*

ORDER

*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Pursuant to a telephonic attorneys7 conference on April 2,
1992, the parties stipulated that since this matter involves a
threshold legal issue, no evidentiary hearing would be necessary.
Rather, the parties and the Administrative Law Judge concurred that
the proper forum for applicant's challenge to the constitutionality
of Section 35-1-68 (as amended May 12, 1981) would be the Court of
Appeals. The factual background prompting that challenge follows.
The deceased herein, David K. Hales sustained a compensable
industrial accident on May 24, 1982 while employed by Emery Mining.
On that date Mr. Hales was involved in a mine cave-in which he
suffered a "crushed pelvis and right leg".
In addition to
receiving medical care for his injuries, the injured worker was
paid temporary total disability for the period may 25, 1982 through
March 15, 1983. Thereafter, Mr. Hales returned to work and on
December 27, 1983 the Commission approved a Compensation Agreement
whereby the employer agreed to pay the Mr. Hales a 3 2% combined
permanent partial impairment for orthopedic residual problems and
"anxiety, depression and intractable pain".
Unfortunately, Mr. Hales continued to have problems and in a
visit to Dr. Hood on March 24, 1986, the Doctor noted that "[h]e
continues to suffer periods of severe paid requiring Percodan, two
tablets every four hours as well as use of a back brace and muscle
relaxant." Dr. Hood concluded that Mr. Hales was not a surgical
candidate and that "..I am very concerned about his long-term use
of medications.

EXHIBIT B

DAVID K. HALES, DECEASED
ORDER
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On or about May 31, 1988 the parties, by and through counsel,
entered a written stipulation that Mr. Hales was permanently and
totally disabled as the result of his industrial accident and preexisting conditions. Mr. Hales was placed on the Second Injury
Fund(nka Employers Reinsurance Fund) permanent total disability
payroll effective June 2, 1988 with lifetime benefits of$218 per
week.
On November 25, 1988 Mr. Hales was found dead of a multiple
drug overdose, as the result of ingestion of codeine, meprobamate,
diazepam, and carisoprodol.
The Commission received Claims for Dependents Benefits on
March 31, 1989 from the surviving spouse, Marilyn R. Hales, and
from Robyn L. Chambers on behalf of her minor children, Delbert,
Monica, and Cristal Hales. In reviewing the claim filed by Robyn
Chambers I note that she has listed herself also as a dependent of
the deceased.
However, in reviewing the file I can find no
evidence that the deceased was providing any support to Ms.
Chambers. The divorce decree appended to her Claim indicates that
she was awarded the nominal sum of $1 per year in alimony, hardly
an amount sufficient to be deemed support for purposes of the
Workers Compensation Act. Therefore, the dependency claim of Robyn
Chambers must fail, and the same is hereby dismissed.
However, the minor children of the deceased are entitled to
the statutory presumption of dependency since the deceased had a
legal obligation of support for them pursuant to the divorce
decree. The surviving spouse, Marilyn Hales, is also entitled to a
presumption of dependency since she was married to the deceased and
living with him at the time of his death.
The employer has denied liability for death benefits in this
matter based on Section 35-1-68 (2) (as amended May 12, 1981). The
relevant portion of that statute provides:
* * *

(2) In case injury causes death within the period of six
years from the date of the accident, the employer or
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the
deceased as provided in section 35-1-81, ...

DAVID K. HALES, DECEASED
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The employer argues that since the death of Mr. Hales on
November 25, 1988 did not result within six years of the industrial
accident of May 24, 1982, the Claims of the applicants are barred
by the statute of limitations contained in Section 68(2), supra.
The applicants contend that the statute of limitations provision
being invoked by the defendants is unconstitutional, and cite as
support Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, 786 P.2d 243 (1990).
With the issue so framed, I would note that the Wrolstad decision
case involved an asbestosis death claim, which had been barred by
the one year statute of repose of Section 35-2-13 (a) (2) of the
Occupational Disease Act, while this case involves Section 35-168(2) of the Workers Compensation Act. While the reasoning might
be said to be analogous, since a different statute was interpreted
by the Court of Appeals in Wrolstad, that decision cannot be
applied by the Commission to the instant case in dispute. Rather,
as stated in the prefatory remarks, the appropriate forum for
applicants' constitutional challenge of Section 68 (2) must be the
Court of Appeals.
The Commission has been granted limited
jurisdiction, and does not possess the necessary general
jurisdiction to rule on questions of constitutionality.
In view of the foregoing, I must dismiss the Claims for
failure to comply with Section 35-1-68(2), Utah Code Annotated.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Claims of the applicants for
death benefits should be and the same are hereby dismissed with
prejudice for failure to comply with 35-1-68(2), Utah Code
Annotated, as amended May 12, 1981.

DAVID K. HALES, DECEASED
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and , unless so filed, this Order shall be final
not subject to review or appeal.

Certified this 3rd day of
April, 1992.

the
the
and
and

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on April 3, 1992, a copy of the attached
Order in the case of David K. Hales, Deceased was mailed to the
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Virginius Dabney, Esq.
350 South 400 East, #202
SLC, Utah 84111
Rinehart Peshell, Esq.
7321 South State
Midvale, Utah 84047
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
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MARILYN R. HALES, Widow of, and *
DELBERT HALES, MONICA HALES, and*
CRISTAL HALES, Minor Dependent *
Children of DAVID K. HALES,
*
Deceased,
*
Applicants,
*
vs.
*
UTAH POWER & LIGHT (EMERY
MINING) and/or ENERGY MUTUAL
Insurance Companies,

*
*
*
*

Respondents,

DENIAL OF MOTION
FOR REVIEW

Case No. 82002549,
B87000882, C88000810,
D89000288, E89000289

*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
This case involves a Motion for Review made by the applicants
challenging the decision by the administrative law judge (ALJ)
which held that U.C.A. Section 35-1-68(2) (as amended May 12, 1981)
barred the claims of the applicants.
The parties and the ALJ
concurred, after a telephonic attorneys' conference, that the
proper forum for applicants' challenge to the constitutionality of
this section would be the Utah Court of Appeals.
Notwithstanding the concurrence of the parties, the Commission
is not sure whether the District Court or the Court of Appeals is
the proper forum to decide the issue presented.
Alumbaugh v.
White, 800 P.2d 825 (Ut. App. 1990) indicated that cases governed
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) (U.C.A. Sections
63-46b-l et seq.) in which hearings were not held were properly
appealed to the District Court, and not to the Court of Appeals.
However, in Velarde v. Bd of Review, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 70 (1992) ,
another case governed by UAPA, the Court of Appeals accepted
jurisdiction over the case, and issued its decision even though the
Court recognized that no formal hearing had been conducted. See
id. fn 2. These cases were issued by two different panels of the
Court of Appeals, but each contained one judge in common. Since
the Velarde case is closer in terms of issue to the instant case,
we will advise the parties that their appeal, if any, from our
decision is to the Court of Appeals.
In view of Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, 786 P.2d 243
(1990), and the Velarde case which was decided after the instant
case, it is apparent that Section 35-1-68(2) is likely to be
declared unconstitutional. Since the Commission has only limited
jurisdiction, the Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ.
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ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated April 3, 1992 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16.
The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on May 6, 1992, a copy of the attached
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of MARILYN R. HALES widow
of DELBERT HALES was
mailed to the following persons at the
following addresses, postage paid:
Rinehart L. Peshell
Fairbourn & Peshell
7321 South State Street
Midvale, UT 84047
Virginius Dabney
Dabney & Dabney
350 South 400 East Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Legal Assistant

